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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Appellees Jan S Freeman, M.D. and Jan S. Freeman M.D., P.C. (Dr. Freeman) 
disagree with how Appellants Rick and Cindy Baldassin (the Baldassins) frame the issues 
in the opening brief. Dr. Freeman will therefore restate the issues after discussing briefly 
how the Baldassins frame the issues on appeal. 
The Baldassins concede that they discovered their medical malpractice claims 
against Dr. Freeman within the applicable two-year limitation period established by the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. The Baldassins also concede that they commenced 
their action against Dr. Freeman well beyond the expiration of the limitation period. 
(R. 381:2-3, 14-15.) In an effort to avoid the effect of the statute of limitations, the 
Baldassins argued in the district court that Dr. Freeman is equitably estopped from raising 
a defense based upon the statute of limitation. Specifically, the Baldassins contended that 
the statements and actions of Dr. Freeman and Mike Imbler, a representative of 
Dr. Freeman's insurance company, induced the Baldassins to commence their action too 
late. (AOB at 16-23.) Dr. Freeman argued their equitable estoppel defense fails as a 
matter of law. 
The Baldassins' statement of the issues in the opening brief begins with the 
recitation of the basic principle that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment "a 
district court must construe all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." 
(AOB at 4.) Dr. Freeman agrees that this principle applies in those instances in which a 
district court is considering a motion for summary judgment and facts are genuinely in 
dispute. That is not this case. In this case, the district court correctly adopted 
Dr. Freeman's statement of undisputed material facts because the Baldassins failed to 
9197232 1 
controvert those dispositive facts in accordance with the requirements of Rule 7(c)(3)(B) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On appeal, the Baldassins do not directly challenge 
the district court's reliance on Rule 7(c)(3)(B),1 but instead chose to argue that the district 
court had a duty to construe their "additional facts" as contoverting Dr. Freeman's 
statements of fact. (AOB at 4.) The Baldassins do not explain how these additional facts 
relieve them of their obligation to comply with the requirements of Rule 7, nor do they 
explain why the district court had a duty to ignore their failure to comply with Rule 7. 
The first issue in the opening brief—whether the district court had a duty to construe 
facts in the light most favorable to the Baldassins—is therefore beside the point. 
In addressing the substance of the equitable estoppel issues, the Baldassins avoid a 
detailed discussion of the fatal flaw in their equitable estoppel argument. The district 
court adopted uncontroverted facts demonstrating that the Baldassins cannot establish the 
first, critical element of equitable estoppel—a statement, admission, act, or failure to act 
by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted—because none of the statements or 
conduct in this case were inconsistent with raising the statute of limitation defense. 
(R. 353.) Most telling for the district court was the fact that Dr. Freeman repeatedly told 
the Baldassins to sue him, a fact the Baldassins conceded in the trial court but fail to 
mention anywhere in the opening brief. (R. 381:17, 20.) Rather than addressing the 
basis of the district court's ruling, the opening brief skips to a discussion of whether the 
Baldassins' reliance was reasonable. The failure to address the "inconsistent statement or 
1
 Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, ^|11, 156 P.3d 175 (appellate courts review 
for abuse of discretion a district court's application of Rule 7). 
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act" element is a tacit concession of the correctness of the district court's ruling on the 
first element. 
While the failure of the Baldassins to address the first element is fatal to their 
appeal, this Court can also affirm on the independent ground that the Baldassins cannot 
establish the second element of equitable estoppel—reliance upon a "statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act" on the part of Dr. Freeman. In this case, the Baldassins 
admitted that they failed to file their lawsuit within the limitations period because they 
believed that suing a doctor would have a negative effect on their high-end piano 
business. (R. 354.) Dr. Freeman cited this evidence in his summary judgment papers, 
and the Baldassins never controverted it. Thus, it stands uncontroverted and undisputed 
that the Baldassins' delay in filing a lawsuit had nothing to do with a "statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act" on the part of Dr. Freeman. 
Issue: Whether a defendant is equitably estopped from raising a statute of 
limitations defense where the defendant repeatedly tells the plaintiffs to file a lawsuit 
within the limitation period, and the plaintiffs fail to file suit because it will hurt their 
own business, not on the basis of anything the defendant did. 
Standard of Review: While this Court ordinarily grants "broadened discretion to 
the trial court on the issue of equitable estoppel," Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 
P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), where issues of equitable estoppel are resolved on a 
motion for summary judgment, the court reviews for correctness. IHC Health Servs. v. D 
& K MgmU 2008 UT 36, ^|15, 606 Utah Adv. Rep. 28. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This appeal involves Utah's two-year statute of limitation on medical malpractice 
claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (2006). Second District Court Judge Thomas L. Kay 
granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Freeman, rejecting the Baldassins' argument 
that Dr. Freeman is estopped from raising the statute of limitation as a defense. 
The Baldassins concede that they did not file a notice of intent to commence 
action until May 7, 2006, nearly one year after the statute of limitation had expired. 
(R. 381:2-3, 14-15.) The Baldassins argue that their untimely action should be excused 
under the doctrine of equitable estoppel because Dr. Freeman "admitted liability" and 
agreed to pay for certain expenses associated with complications stemming from the 
surgery. (AOB at 12.) Notably, the opening brief fails to mention the fact the district 
court found dispositive: Dr. Freeman repeatedly told the Baldassins that they should sue 
him, and therefore, Dr. Freeman's current defense that the Baldassins should have sued 
him during the limitation period is not inconsistent with his prior statements and acts. 
(R. 351-54.) 
Implicit in this Court's resolution of this legal issue is the question of whether 
public policy should encourage a physician to address complications of treatment with 
prompt, appropriate and non-judgmental contributions to the welfare of his or her patient, 
or whether the physician should refrain from interacting with and supporting the patient 
out of concern that the physician's actions and statements might be misconstrued and 
used as the basis for precluding the physician's use of a statute of limitations defense. 
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II. Course of Proceedings 
On May 7, 2006, the Baldassins served a notice of intent to commence a medical 
malpractice action against Dr. Freeman, as required by Utah Code section 78-14-8. The 
Baldassins later filed a complaint on March 12, 2007, in which they set forth claims of 
medical malpractice and loss of consortium, as well as an equitable estoppel defense to 
Dr. Freeman's apparently anticipated statute of limitation defense. (R. 189-94.) 
After fact discovery had been completed, Dr. Freeman moved for summary 
judgment on the ground that the Baldassins' equitable estoppel defense fails as a matter 
of law, and therefore, their claims are barred by the statute of limitation. (R. 119-37.) In 
opposing Dr. Freeman's motion, the Baldassins failed to comply with the requirements of 
Rule 7. (R. 351.) In response to the statements of undisputed material fact set forth in 
Dr. Freeman's moving papers, the Baldassins merely responded that they "do not 
dispute" that the testimony quoted by Dr. Freeman was accurate. (R. 216.) The 
Baldassins did not provide the mandatory "verbatim restatement" of the facts set forth by 
Dr. Freeman's and, more important, never stated which, if any, of the facts they intended 
to controvert. (R. 216-17.) Instead, the Baldassins provided twenty-eight numbered 
paragraphs of "additional facts," none of which disputed either (i) the fact that 
Dr. Freeman repeatedly told the Baldassins that they should sue him, or (ii) the fact that 
the Baldassins did not sue Dr. Freeman because of their concern for the possible damage 
to their high-end piano business. (R. 125-26; 216-26.) 
2
 It is undisputed that both of these claims are governed by the two-year statute of 
limitation set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. (R. 381:2-3, 14-15.) 
Therefore, all of the Baldassins' claims are untimely if their equitable estoppel argument 
fails. 
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On April 22, 2008, the district court granted Dr. Freeman's motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 351.) The district court first ruled that the Baldassins had failed to comply 
with Rule 7, and therefore, Dr. Freeman's statements of fact were thereby "deemed 
admitted for the purpose of this motion." (R. 351.) The district court then ruled that the 
Baldassins' equitable estoppel defense failed as a matter of law because they had not 
established the first of three required elements of equitable estoppel. (R. 353.) Finding 
no inconsistent statement or act, the district court ruled that Dr. Freeman's defense 
concerning the statute of limitation was consistent with his statements and actions and 
was particularly consistent with his having repeatedly told the Baldassins that they should 
sue him. (R. 353.) The district court ruled that the missing first element of equitable 
estoppel was, by itself, a sufficient ground to grant summary judgment in favor of 
Dr. Freeman. (R.353.) 
In what the district court described as "an additional and alternative ground" for 
granting summary judgment, the court went on to rule that the undisputed facts also 
demonstrate that the Baldassins did not refrain from filing suit on the basis of their 
reliance upon statements or actions of Dr. Freeman or Mr. Imbler. (R. 354.) Instead, the 
district court ruled that the Baldassins failed to file within the limitation period "because 
it would hurt their high-end piano business if they sued a doctor." (R. 354.) Therefore, 
the missing second of the three required elements of equitable estoppel provided an 
alternative ground for granting summary judgment. 
On April 29, 2008, the district court entered an order dismissing the Baldassins' 
claims. (R. 357.) On May 6, 2008, the Baldassins filed their notice of appeal. (R. 370.) 
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III. Statement of Facts 
As previously noted, the district court admitted Dr. Freeman's statements of fact 
as uncontroverted and undisputed pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (R. 351.) The Baldassins do not directly argue on appeal that the district 
court abused its discretion in following the requirements of Rule 7. Bluffdale City v. 
Smith, 2007 UT App. 25, ^[11, 156 P.3d 175 (appellate courts review for abuse of 
discretion a district court application of Rule 7). Because the opening brief fails to 
discuss in detail the facts adopted by the district court pursuant to Rule 7, Dr. Freeman 
will recite those facts. (AOB at 6-10.) 
On May 16, 2003, Dr. Freeman performed hernia repair surgery on Mr. Baldassin. 
(R. 352.) During the surgery, Dr. Freeman inadvertently "nicked" Mr. Baldassin's colon, 
thereby creating a small hole in the colon. (R. 352.) Dr. Freeman recognized the 
complication and repaired the hole in the colon during the initial surgery. (R. 123, 352.) 
About a week later, Dr. Freeman asked the Baldassins to bring him their medical bills so 
that he could take care of them. (R. 352.) Importantly, Dr. Freeman did not (i) concede 
liability, as the Baldassins' repeatedly imply; (ii) agree to pay any specific amount of 
money, (iii) agree to make payments for a specific time period, or (iv) agree to pay the 
medical bills in exchange for an agreement not to sue him. (R. 122-23; 352.) 
To the contrary, on May 22, 2003, Dr. Freeman told Mrs. Baldassin that "You 
need to sue me." (R. 352.) Thereafter, "Dr. Freeman frequently told [the Baldassins] that 
they needed to sue him." (R. 352.) Other people also repeatedly urged the Baldassins to 
sue Dr. Freeman. (R. 352.) When Mrs. Baldassin told Dr. Freeman that others had told 
them that they needed to file suit, he responded, "You're right." (R. 352.) 
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To coordinate payment of some of the Baldassins' medical bills, Dr. Freeman 
referred the Baldassins to Mike Imbler, a representative of Dr. Freeman's insurance 
carrier. (R. 352.) Like Dr. Freeman, Mr. Imbler did not (i) concede liability; (ii) agree to 
pay any specific amount of money, (iii) agree to make payments for a specific time 
period, or (iv) agree to pay the medical bills in exchange for an agreement not to sue him. 
(R. 125-26; 352.) Mr. Imbler did tell the Baldassins that they needed to perfect their 
claims within the two-year statute of limitation. (R. 352.) Mrs. Baldassin responded by 
explaining that they "couldn't file a lawsuit against a physician because that would not be 
good for our [high-end piano] business." (R. 352.) 
Dr. Freeman's insurance carrier made payments for some of the Baldassins' bills 
until February 2005, at which time it stopped making payments because it determined 
that the bills submitted by the Baldassins were not related to the colon surgery.4 (R. 299, 
352.) The two-year statute of limitation expired three months later, on or about May 16, 
2005. 
3
 This fact, like all other facts set forth in Dr. Freeman's moving papers, was not 
controverted by the Baldassins. Unlike many of the other facts set forth by Dr. Freeman, 
however, Baldassins did attempt to deny this fact in their set of additional facts. (R. 294.) 
If this Court adopts the Baldassins' Rule 7 argument in the opening brief, then this fact is 
disputed. For reasons explained below, however, this would not change the outcome. 
The dispositive facts are that (i) Dr. Freeman, and others, repeatedly told the Baldassins 
to file a lawsuit and (ii) the Baldassins failed to take Dr. Freeman's advice because they 
believed it would hurt their piano business, not because of anything Dr. Freeman did. 
Therefore, ultimately Mr. Imbler's statement is irrelevant. 
4
 Dr. Freeman will not address the continuing treatment theory raised by the Baldassins in 
the trial court because they do not raise this issue in the opening brief and have therefore 
abandoned it. Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89,1J23, 16 P.3d 540 (It is well settled that 
"issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were not presented in the opening 
brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the appellate court."). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Baldassins argue that there are disputed issues of fact concerning whether 
Dr. Freeman is equitably estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense. 
Specifically, the Baldassins argue that it was reasonable for the Baldassins to commence 
their medical malpractice claims more than one year after the statute of limitation had 
expired in light of Dr. Freeman's (i) alleged admission of liability and (ii) promise to pay 
some of their bills. (AOB at 16-23.) This argument mischaracterizes Dr. Freeman's 
statements as "admissions of liability," and ignores entirely the undisputed dispositive 
facts upon with the district court based its decision. 
The first two dements of equitable estoppel are (i) "a statement, admission, aet, or 
failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted," and (ii) "reasonable 
action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, 
admission, act or failure to act." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl 896 P.2d 644, 648 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (emphasis added). As the district court ruled, the Baldassins failed to 
demonstrate a genuine disputed issue of material fact as to either, let alone both, of these 
elements. (R 353-54.) The district court was correct. 
First, it is undisputed that during the limitation period Dr. Freeman repeatedly told 
the Baldassins to sue him, statements that are not inconsistent with Dr. Freeman's 
position that the Baldassins should have commenced an action within two years. Second, 
the Baldassins admitted that they did not rely upon Dr. Freeman's statements or conduct 
in failing to file suit, but instead failed to file because they believed a lawsuit would hurt 
their piano business. The Baldassins did not, and cannot, controvert these two facts, each 
of which is dispositive of their equitable estoppel defense. 
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ARGUMENT 
The opening brief fails to inform the Court of the primary basis for the district 
court's rejection of the Baldassins' equitable estoppel argument. The district court found 
"the undisputed facts are that [Dr. Freeman] paid for two sets of bills, that Dr. Freeman 
told plaintiffs (1) that he nicked the colon, (2) that he should have known better, and 
(3) that they should sue him." (R. 353 (emphasis added).) The court then recognized that 
"[n]one of these acts or statements is inconsistent with Dr. Freeman asserting the statute 
of limitations in this case. Indeed, telling the Plaintiffs that they should sue him is 
consistent, not inconsistent, with asserting the statute of limitations. These acts or 
statements did not contain an admission and made no promise to pay." (R. 353 
(emphasis added).) 
Even though the district court found it dispositive that Dr. Freeman repeatedly told 
the Baldassins to sue him during the limitation period, the opening brief fails to mention, 
let alone address, this fatal flaw in the Baldassins' equitable estoppel defense. (R. 352-
54.) This fact is both undisputed and dispositive. 
It is undisputed for two reasons. First, the Baldassins failed to dispute the fact in 
their opposition memorandum, either by directly controverting Dr. Freeman's statement 
of undisputed material facts or by including a specific statement in their "Additional 
Material Facts" section. (R. 216-25.) Second, counsel for the Baldassins admitted during 
oral argument that the Baldassins had conceded that Dr. Freeman, and others, repeatedly 
told them to file suit. (R. 124, 216-17, 381:20.) This fact is dispositive because it 
demonstrates Dr. Freeman did not act inconsistently with his current assertion of the 
statue of limitations defense. The Court should affirm. 
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This Court also can affirm on an alternative ground. The Baldassins cannot 
demonstrate that they failed to file suit because they relied, let alone reasonably relied, 
upon Dr. Freeman's or Mr. Imbler's statements or conduct. Instead, as the Baldassins 
explained, they failed to file suit "because it would hurt their high-end piano business if 
they sued a doctor." (R. 353-54.) The Baldassins' equitable estoppel defense therefore 
fails as a matter of law not only because Dr. Freeman's statements and conduct are not 
inconsistent with his statute of limitations defense, but also because the Baldassins did 
not rely upon his statements or conduct in failing to file suit within the limitations period. 
I. Because The Baldassins Failed To Comply With The Requirements of Rule 
7(c)(3)(B), The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Admitting 
Dr. Freeman's Statement Of Facts As Undisputed 
Before addressing the merits of the Baldassins' equitable estoppel defense, 
Dr. Freeman first demonstrates that the Baldassins' argument concerning Rule 7 is both 
incorrect and beside the point. The district court admitted Dr. Freeman's statements of 
fact as undisputed because the Baldassins failed to comply with Rule 7 in opposing 
Dr. Freeman's motion for summary judgment. (R. 353.) The district court did not abuse 
its discretion. Under Rule 7(c)(3)(B), "[a] memorandum opposing a motion for summary 
judgment shall contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute." Id. 
(emphasis added). The rule then makes clear that if the moving party's facts are not 
controverted appropriately, then they are "deemed admitted for the purpose of summary 
judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A). 
The purpose of requiring the opposing party to provide an explanation of the 
grounds for controverting any of the facts set forth by the moving party is so the district 
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court need not wade through the moving papers and compare them with the opposition 
papers to identify whether there are disputed issues of material fact. Bluffdale City v. 
Smith, 2007 UT App 25, %l 1, 156 P3d 175; see also Anderson Develop. Co. v. Tobias, 
2005 UT 36, ^ 21 n.3, 116 P.3d 323 (trial courts have discretion to grant summary 
judgment for non-compliance with Rule 7); Quinn, Judge Anthony B., and Miller, Joanna 
E., Statements of Material Fact: Increasing Effectiveness and Avoiding Pitfalls, 21 Utah 
Bar J. 5, 42-47 (2008) (noting that Utah appellate courts have never reversed a grant of 
summary judgment after a trial court admits a moving party's facts for the non-moving 
party's failure to comply with Rule 7). A non-moving party's failure to identify those 
facts it contents are in dispute is "not merely technical in nature," which is the type of 
noncompliance with Rule 7 that this Court may consider excusable.5 Bluffdale City, 
2007UTApp25at1fll. 
Here, the Baldassins do not argue that the district court abused its discretion under 
Rule 7 in admitting Dr. Freeman's facts as undisputed. Instead, the Baldassins assert that 
the district court erred, as a matter of law, in utilizing Dr. Freeman's statement of facts. 
(AOB at 4, 13, 15.) Specifically, the Baldassins argue that Rule 7 does not require the 
non-moving party to state which of a moving party's facts are disputed, but instead 
5
 For this reason, the Baldassins' opposition memorandum also did not "substantially 
comply" with Rule 7, assuming that "substantial compliance" remains, or ever was, the 
standard under Rule 7. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT App 25 at ^[11. For reasons explained at 
length by Judge Quinn in his recent Bar Journal article, which is attached as Addendum 
B, "substantial compliance" has never been the standard under Rule 7, and the best 
evidence of this is that a Utah appellate court has never reversed a summary judgment on 
the ground that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting facts under Rule 7. 
Quinn, Statements of Material Fact: Increasing Effectiveness and Avoiding Pitfalls, at 
42-47. 
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allows the opposing party to simply make "this showing with their additional material 
facts." (AOB at 15.) The Baldassins' argument misstates the requirements of Rule 7 
and, if correct, would render Rule 7 meaningless. 
The language of Rule 7 demonstrates that the district court did not misapply the 
rule. To support a motion for summary judgment, a moving party must (i) set forth "a 
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue 
exists," (ii) number each material fact and support it "by citation to relevant materials, 
such as affidavits or discovery materials," and (iii) demonstrate that under these facts, it 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A), 56. Dr. Freeman 
complied with each requirement. In the moving papers, Dr. Freeman listed what he 
asserted were twenty-nine separate undisputed material facts, each of which was, as 
required by Rule 7, supported by a citation to the record and to relevant discovery 
materials, including the deposition testimony of Mr. Baldassin, Mrs. Baldassin, 
Dr. Freeman and Mr. Imbler. (R. 122-27.) 
In the Baldassins' papers opposing summary judgment, they concede that 
Dr. Freeman's statements of material fact contain citations to deposition testimony; 
however, the Baldassins attempt to minimize the statements of fact by characterizing 
them as containing "simply excerpts from depositions," as if the sworn statements of 
parties were somehow insufficient to support summary judgment. More important, the 
Baldassins' description further demonstrates that Dr. Freeman did precisely what was 
required by Rule 7: provide citations to discovery materials to support his statement of 
facts. 
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Once Dr. Freeman properly supported his memorandum with the required 
statement of undisputed material facts and corresponding citations, it was incumbent 
upon the Baldassins to determine which, if any, of those facts they desired to and could 
legitimately controvert. For all such facts, the Baldassins were required to provide (i) a 
"verbatim restatement" of the fact, (ii) an explanation of the ground or grounds for 
controverting the fact, and (iii) a citation to relevant materials that place the fact in 
controversy. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). The language of Rule 7 could not be more clear 
in setting forth these requirements. Nor could is be more clear in setting forth the 
consequences for failing to comply with these requirements: The plain language of Rule 
7(c)(3)(A) states, "Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the responding 
party." This plain language mandates that each uncontroverted fact is deemed admitted. 
Under Rule 7 (and its precursor, Rule 4-501), "all facts set forth in the movant's 
statement of facts are 'deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement,'" and by failing to do so, the 
non-moving party is "estopped from now arguing that there was insufficient evidence on 
this point." Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. DisU 2002 UT 130, ^[51, 63 P.3d 705. The district 
court did nothing more than follow the plain language of the rule when it admitted Dr. 
Freeman's facts as uncontrovered and undisputed. 
The Baldassins attempt to avoid the consequences of their failure by pointing to 
the "Additional Material Facts" section of their opposition memorandum. They would 
have this Court impose a duty on trial court judges that the drafters of Rule 7 never 
contemplated and certainly never included in the language of the rule. The Baldassins 
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argue that the district court in this case should have parsed the Additional Material Facts 
section to attempt to determine which, if any, of the Baldassins' additional facts 
correspond to any of Dr. Freeman's statements of undisputed material fact. (AOB at 15.) 
In that manner, so the argument goes, the district court would have made its own 
determination of which facts in the case were truly in controversy. (Id.) 
i 
The Baldassins' argument fails. The whole point of Rule 7 is to impose an 
obligation on the non-moving party, not the trial court and now this Court, to disclose 
which facts are controverted. Trial court judges should not be saddled with the obligation 
to do the work that Rule 7 specifically delegates to a party. If nothing else, the time 
required of trial court judges would make such an obligation impractical.6 
Dr. Freeman complied with Rule 7, and the Baldassins did not. The district court 
was well within its discretion to enforce the plain language of the rule and deem admitted 
all of the undisputed material facts set forth by Dr. Freeman. Regardless, none of the 
Baldassins' "additional facts" provide a legally sufficient basis to place any of the key, 
dispositive facts in controversy. For this reason, the Court need not address the Rule 7 
issue to affirm: The ruling of the district court on this point was correct, even if it had 
abused its discretion in admitted Dr. Freeman's facts pursuant to Rule 7. 
6
 The Baldassins argue that unless this Court adopts their reading of Rule 7, the rule will 
become "a nullity." (AOB at 15.) This is incorrect. The reason Rule 7 contemplates a 
non-moving party providing "additional facts" is that a moving party's papers may not 
set forth facts that can be controverted, but nonetheless the non-moving party has a valid 
defense. For example, if Dr. Freeman's moving papers had not addressed the Baldassins' 
equitable estoppel defense, then the Baldassins would have had little choice but to set 
forth additional facts to support their equitable estoppel defense. This did not happen 
here and is not what happens in the vast majority of cases. Dr. Freeman set forth material 
facts demonstrating the equitable estoppel defense fails as a matter of law, and the 
Baldassins chose not to dispute these facts, likely because they could not dispute them. 
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II. Dr. Freeman Is Not Equitably Estopped From Raising a Statute of 
Limitations Defense Because He Repeatedly Told the Baldassins to Sue Him 
The Baldassins' equitable estoppel defense fails as a matter of law because they 
cannot satisfy either the first or second elements of equitable estoppel. Under Utah law, 
equitable estoppel has three elements: "(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by 
one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the 
other party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to 
act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act." Travelers Ins. 
Co. v. Kearl 896 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added). 
In this case, the district court ruled that summary judgment was appropriate 
because the Baldassins had failed to establish the first, threshold requirement of equitable 
estoppel. (R. 353.) Then, in what was described as an "additional and alternative" 
ground for summary judgment, the district court ruled that the Baldassins had failed to 
establish the second required element of equitable estoppel. (R. 354.) Dr. Freeman 
submits that the district court was correct in its analysis. Because the missing first 
element is, by itself, a sufficient ground for affirming summary judgment, the Court need 
not address the missing second element. Nonetheless, Dr. Freeman will address each 
element in turn. 
The Baldassins contend that Dr. Freeman acted in a manner inconsistent with 
asserting a statute of limitations defense when he or his insurance company (i) admitted a 
"medical mistake," and (ii) paid some of the Baldassins' medical bills. (AOB at 16-20.) 
First, if by "medical mistake," the Baldassins mean that Dr. Freeman admitted liability, 
then they are incorrect, as Dr. Freeman simply inadvertently nicked a bowel during 
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surgery. An inadvertent bowel perforation, while unfortunate, is a known complication 
that can occur in the absence of negligence. Second, and regardless, the alleged conduct 
is not inconsistent with asserting a statute of limitations defense. 
The opening brief cites cases in which an insurance adjuster "admitted liability 
and promised compensation," which led the plaintiff "to believe that the only unresolved 
issue was the ascertainment of her damages." (AOB at 18 (quoting Rice v. Granite Sch. 
DisU 456 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1969) and citing Hart v. Bridges, 591 P.2d 1172, 1174 
(Okla. 1979) (equitable estoppel established because the defendant "intentionally misled 
plaintiff by promising to settle and pay claim).) Therefore, the Baldassins continue, 
their equitable estoppel defense must succeed because they were similarly led to believe 
that they did not need to file suit when Dr. Freeman (i) admitted that he nicked 
Mr. Baldassin's colon and (ii) paid certain medical expenses. (AOB at 21.) This 
argument fails for a number of reasons. 
The most glaring flaw in the Baldassins' argument stems from the glaring 
omission in the opening brief: Dr. Freeman, and others, repeatedly told them to file a 
lawsuit during the limitation period. The reason for the omission is apparent. 
Dr. Freeman's repeated statements are the exact opposite of what the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel requires. All of the various statements and actions in this case aside, 
7
 In fact, the district court specifically found that Dr. Freeman's statements and conduct 
"did not contain an admission." (R. 353.) Regardless, the admission of liability is beside 
the point here because any "admission" occurred prior to Dr. Freeman repeatedly telling 
the Baldassins to file suit against him. This alone distinguishes this case from every case 
cited by the Baldassins and demonstrates that any "admission" could not have given the 
impression that the Baldassins did not need to file a suit against Dr. Freeman. 
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Dr. Freeman submits that no reasonable person could claim that he or she was duped into 
inaction by being told, "You should sue me." 
Consistent with this, the district court specifically found that the following 
combination of events is not inconsistent with asserting a statute of limitation defense: 
Dr. Freeman "paid two sets of bills/' and "told plaintiffs (1) that he nicked the colon, 
(2) that he should have known better, and (3) that they should sue him." (R. 353.) The 
district court was correct. The crucial aspect of each case cited in the opening brief is 
that the plaintiff drew an arguably reasonable inference—that filing suit was 
unnecessary—from statements and actions that might be subject to different 
interpretations.8 The statement, "You should sue me" is not subject to different 
interpretations. Telling someone to file a lawsuit simply cannot "lull an adversary into a 
false sense of security," as required under Utah law. Rice, 456 P.2d at 163. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has explained, the "doctrine of equitable estoppel does 
not operate in favor of one who has knowledge of the essential facts." Consolidation 
Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 886 P.2d 514, 523 (Utah 1994) (citation 
omitted). Here, the Baldassins were made aware that they needed to file suit during the 
limitations period when Dr. Freeman, and others, told them to file a lawsuit. (R. 126.) 
8
 Mandola v. Mariotti, 557 S.W.2d 350, 351 (Tex. App 1977) (insurance company 
"advised [plaintiff] that she did not need an attorney because her company would take 
care of all damages," and never told the plaintiff to file suit); Sander v. Wright, 394 
N.W.2d 896, 899 (S.D. 1986) (insurance company made payments until after statute of 
limitations because it thought the plaintiff would "run to" an attorney, and never told the 
plaintiff to file suit); Gagner v. Strekouras, 423 A.2d 1168, 1169 (R.I. 1980) (negotiations 
with plaintiff were calculated "to lull the claimant into a reasonable belief that his claim 
will be settled without a suit," and never told the plaintiff to file suit); Zaayer v. Axel, 
429 N.E.2d 607, 611 (111. App Ct. 1981) (insurance company did nothing to revoke the 
inducement caused by making payments, such as by telling the plaintiff to file suit). 
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Ultimately, the Baldassins chose not to file a lawsuit "because it would hurt their high-
end piano business if they sued a doctor." (R. 126, 353-54.) The Baldassins' equitable 
estoppel claim therefore fails as a matter of law. 
Confirming this is the fact that the Baldassins never asked for, nor received, any 
compensation for their claimed general damages. Instead, Dr. Freeman paid only 
medical expenses and lost wages. (R. 125-26.) Under these circumstances, the 
interaction between Dr. Freeman and the Baldassins simply cannot be characterized as 
"settlement negotiations," which is how the Utah Supreme Court described the 
interactions at issue in Rice. 456 P.2d at 163. The Baldassins did not discuss with 
Dr. Freeman the claims they assert, or damages they seek, in this lawsuit. There were no 
settlement negotiations. There were no discussions concerning the Baldassins releasing 
any claims. And unlike in Rice, Dr. Freeman did not "intentionally deceive" the 
Baldassins into bringing their action after the limitation period.9 Id. at 165. To the 
contrary, Dr. Baldassin intentionally told the Baldassins to file suit. For these reasons, 
Dr. Freeman's statements and conduct, especially viewed as a whole, are not inconsistent 
with his assertion of a statute of limitations defense. 
Policy considerations also support the district court's ruling. If the Baldassins 
were correct that telling a patient to file suit is insufficient to preclude equitable estoppel, 
then any time a physician voluntarily makes payments to cover some of a patient's 
medical expenses, the physician would run the risk of waiving a statute of limitation 
defense. Physicians would be discouraged from ever helping their patients with 
9
 Similarly, unlike in Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corporation, Dr. Freeman did not 
"assure" the Baldassins "that there would be a settlement within the policy limits." 522 
P.2dl252, 1255 (Utah 1974). 
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payments when it is unclear whether the physician caused harm, as doing so could later 
be used against the physician regardless of what else is done to make the patient aware of 
the limitation period, including specifically and repeatedly telling the patient to file suit. 
During oral argument, the district court recognized these policy considerations: 
"so what should a doctor do in this situation if basically they're concerned about their 
patient and what should be the, you know, kind of the policy that the law wants to 
encourage. Is it to say, you know, somebody, if there is a problem with a surgery that 
they don't say a word to these people, that they don't try to be helpful?" (R. 381:23.) 
What the rule urged by the Baldassins brings to mind is the ironic statement that "No 
good deed goes unpunished." Dr. Freeman submits that he should not be "punished" for 
acting professionally and appropriately, while still preserving his legal rights. 
Fortunately, Utah law does not "punish" physicians for such conduct. 
In the end, neither law nor public policy supports the rule urged by the Baldassins. 
Repeatedly telling a patient to file suit, coupled with a frank discussion about what went 
wrong during a surgery and payment of some of the patient's medical expenses, is not 
inconsistent with asserting a statute of limitation defense. The district court did not err in 
rejecting the Baldassins' equitable estoppel argument. This Court should affirm. 
III. Dr. Freeman Is Not Equitably Estopped From Raising a Statute of Limitation 
Defense Because the Baldassins' Decision Not to File Suit Was Based Upon 
Their Own Belief That Filing Suit Would Harm Their Piano Business 
An additional and independent ground to affirm the district court is the fact that 
the Baldassins have not demonstrated that in deciding not to file suit against Dr. Freeman, 
they relied, let alone reasonably relied, and acted upon the basis of Dr. Freeman's and 
Mr. Imbler's statements and conduct. The second element of equitable estoppel requires 
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a plaintiff to demonstrate "reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the 
basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act." Kearl» 896 P.2d at 
647 (emphasis added). The district court ruled that "rather than showing they failed to 
act on the basis of Dr. Freeman's conduct, [the Baldassins] stated that Dr. Freeman and 
others told them to sue him and that the reason they did not sue him was because it would 
hurt their high-end piano business if they sued a doctor." (R. 354.) Again, the district 
court was correct. 
The Baldassins argue that whether their reliance was reasonable is a question of 
fact that cannot be decided on summary judgment. (AOB at 22.) Again, however, the 
Baldassins focus only upon the fact that Dr. Freeman paid some of their medical 
expenses and admitted that he had nicked Mr. Baldassin's colon during surgery. (AOB at 
22.) What they fail to mention is their own admission that they did not file a lawsuit 
because it "would not be good for business." (R. 126, 352.) In Dr. Freeman's moving 
papers, he cites testimony that the Baldassins indicated "they could not file a lawsuit 
against a physician because . . . that would not be good for business." (R. 126 
(alternation in original.) The Baldassins did not dispute this fact, which demonstrates 
that their failure to file suit had nothing to do with anything Dr. Freeman or Mr. Imbler 
said or did. Therefore, the Baldassins cannot establish reliance, a shortcoming that is 
fatal to their equitable estoppel defense. | 
To find equitable estoppel under the circumstances present here not only would 
discourage physicians from voluntarily helping patients when the physician may have 
done something wrong, but also would render the second element of equitable estoppel 
meaningless. If one can fail to file a lawsuit in "reasonable" reliance upon a statement 
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that one needs to file a lawsuit, then anything would qualify as reasonable reliance. The 
district court did not err. This Court should affirm. 
CONCLUSION 
The Baldassins' Rule 7 argument is not only incorrect, but also a red herring. The 
dispositive facts in this case are undisputed: Dr. Freeman, and others, repeatedly told the 
Baldassins to file a lawsuit within the statute of limitation period. This conduct, coupled 
with paying certain medical bills, is not inconsistent with asserting a statute of limitations 
defense. Moreover, the Baldassins cannot demonstrate that they relied, let alone 
reasonably relied, and acted upon the basis of Dr. Freeman's urging them to sue him 
when they failed to sue him, especially where they admit that they delayed in filing suit 
because they believed a lawsuit would harm their high-end piano business. For both 
reasons, the Baldassins' equitable estoppel defense fails as a matter of law. This Court 
should affirm. 
Respectfully Submitted this 29th day of October, 2008. 
SlSELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
TroyL.«oGher 
Attorney for Appellee 
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This case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment heard on April 11, 2008. Jeffrey R. Oritt appeared for Plaintiffs and 
Scott A. Dubois appeared for Defendants. Following a thorough review of the 
pleadings relating to this motion, and the arguments of counsel, and good cause 
appearing, the Court now issues its ruling. 
I. Factual Background 
In the Memorandum in Support of Defendants'Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Defendants complied with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
in setting forth the Statement of Undisputed Facts. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Opposition did not controvert any of Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts. 
Instead, Plaintiffs set forth a statement of Additional Material Facts as allowed by 
Rule 7. Because Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts were not 
controverted, they are deemed admitted for the purpose of this motion. Rule 7 
(c)(3)(A). Although Defendants did not controvert the Additional Material Facts 
of Plaintiffs, Rule 7 is silent as to whether such statements are deemed admitted. 
Ruling on Defendants* Motion for Summary Judgment 
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The Additional Material Facts from Plaintiffs' Memorandum show that in a 
conversation one year after the original surgery Dr. Freeman told Plaintiff, "Yeah, 
you have a heck of a scar for a hernia. And then he said, I've been doing this for 
thirty years. I should have known better." (Para. 9). 
II. Legal Analysis 
In order to establish estoppel as a defense to the statute of limitations, a 
party must prove each of the following elements: 
1. A statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a 
claim later asserted; 
2. Reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first 
party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and 
3. Injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate the statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
Travelers Ins. Co. v. KearL 896 P2d 644, 647 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
Defendants contend that the undisputed facts show that Plaintiffs cannot 
establish either of the first two elements of estoppel. As to the first element, the 
undisputed facts are that Defendants paid for two sets of bills, that Dr. Freeman 
told plaintiffs (1) that he nicked the colon, (2) that he should have known better, 
and (3) that they should sue him. 
None of these acts or statements is inconsistent with Dr. Freeman asserting 
the statute of limitations in this case. Indeed, telling the Plaintiffs that they should 
sue him is consistent, not inconsistent, with asserting the statute of limitations. 
These acts or statements did not contain an admission and made no promise to 
pay. See McKinnon v. Tambrands. Inc., 815 F. Supp. 415 (D. Utah 1993). 
Plaintiffs rely on Rice v. Granite School District 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1989) 
and Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 552 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1974). However, in 
both of those cases, insurance adjustors had promised and assured plaintiffs that 
they would be compensated for their injuries. As such, Rice and Whitaker do not 
help Plaintiffs. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not and cannot meet the first element 
of estoppel. 
Because the first element has not been met, Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted for Plaintiffs' failure to establish the first element 
3 
III. Conclusion 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted. 
Dated this ^ ^ day of April, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
<^U»¥*4/*Afo 
Thomas L. Kay \ J 
District Judge 
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Statements of Material Fact: 
Increasing Effectiveness and Avoiding Pitfalls 
by Judge Anthony B. Quinn and Joanna E. Miller 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7, is a precise rule with clear 
consequences for noncompliance. However, the current practice 
with respect to rule 7 is anything but clear or precise. From a 
trial court's perspective there are two explanations for this lack 
of clarity: Utah attorneys have become adept at avoiding the 
intention of the rule and Utah appellate decisions have not been 
clear about the discretion a trial court has to deem facts admitted 
for a failure to comply with the rule. This article seeks to clarify 
the purpose of rule 7, to outline the appellate confusion about 
its application and to present at least one judge's view of how 
the rule should operate. 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 7 
Rule 7 requires a memorandum supporting a motion for summary 
judgment to set forth facts the movant claims are undisputed in 
separate numbered paragraphs with references to the record. 
See UTAH R Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A). An opposition memorandum must 
include a verbatim restatement of any disputed facts with an 
explanation of the dispute, supported by citations to the record. 
See UTAH R. CIV. P. 7(c)(3)(B). If parties do not controvert 
facts in this fashion, rule 7 makes clear that they are deemed 
admitted for purposes of summary judgment. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 
7(c)(3)(A). 
Rule 7's procedural requirements were formerly in Utah Rule of 
Judicial Administration 4-501 (2) (A) and (B). Rule 4-501 was 
repealed November 1,2003, and the procedures for summary 
judgment were moved to rule 7. The Rules of Judicial Administra-
tion were intended to make Utah's judicial system more efficient 
and transparent See Chief Justice Gorden R. Hall, UTAH CODE OF 
JUD ADMIN , Oct. 1988, (v). Rule 4-501 (2) (B), which is now 
JIDGEASIHOSYB QCIW has been a 
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rule 7(c) (3) (B), created a precise means for trial judges and 
reviewing courts to decide whether genuine issues of material fact 
precluded summary judgment. In 2001 the rule was substan-
tially amended and the 'Verbatim restatement" requirement 
became a part of the rule. Amendment Notes, UTAH R. JUD. 
ADMIN. 4-501 (2002). Both versions of the rule established a 
bright-line: controvert the facts appropriately or they will be 
deemed admitted. 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF A 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 7 
Rule 7 clearly sets forth the consequences of a failure to controvert 
facts with citations to the record, yet certain decisions from Utah's 
appellate courts have made a trial court's discretion to admit 
those facts far less clear. Trial courts traditionally had discretion 
to deem such uncontroverted facts admitted, but after the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Salt Lake County v Metro West 
Ready Mix, Inc. (Metro West), 2004 UT 23,89 R3d 155, the 
extent of that discretion was questioned The Utah Court of Appeals 
has questioned the meaning of the Metro West decision and 
expanded it through several cases addressing the consequences 
of a party's failure to comply with rule 4-501 or rule 7. 
Utah Trial Courts Traditionally Had Discretion to Deem 
Facts Admitted 
Before Metro West, Utah's trial courts clearly had discretion to 
deem facts admitted for noncompliance with rule 4-501. Both 
of Utah's appellate courts affirmed the trial court's decision to 
deem facts admitted and grant summary judgment for failure 
to comply with 4-501 SeeFennellv Green, 2003 UTApp 291, 
f 8,77 P3d 339 (citing Lovendahlv Jordan School District, 
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brief, Metro West Ready Mix mentions: 'In support of its motion 
for summary judgment, Metro West set forth several numbered 
paragraphs of undisputed fact. The county did not dispute any 
of Metro West's facts as required by Rule 4-501 (2) (b) of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration." 
Brief of Defendant-Appellee, at 24, Salt Lake County v. Metro 
West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 W 23 (No. 20020701). This suggests 
an understanding that the rule is discretionary, and seems to 
say to the Utah Supreme Court, "even if you disagree with us 
on the merits, you can affirm the summary judgment because 
of Salt Lake County's failure to comply with rule 4-501." Rule 
4-501 was clearly not the focus of their claim, and neither party, 
nor the Utah Supreme Court, referred to rule 4-501 at oral 
argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Salt Lake County 
v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23 (No. 20020701). 
This consideration of the entire record casts Metro West in 
a very different light than if the trial judge had been reversed 
for requiring strict compliance with rules 7(c) (3) (B) or 4-
501(2)(B). 
The Utah Court of Appeals Interprets Metro West to 
Require a Harmless Non-Compliance Test for Trial 
Courts to Deem Facts Admitted. 
In cases decided after Metro West, the Utah Court of Appeals 
has seemingly interpreted the case as if the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court for deeming facts admitted for 
a violation of rule 4-501 (2) (B). For example, in Gary Porter 
Construction v. Fox Construction, 2004 UT App. 354,101 
R3d 371, the Utah Court of Appeals determined that the trial 
court had not abused its discretion to deem facts admitted under 
Fennett and Lovendabl because the opposing party did not properly 
controvert the facts, but it had abused its discretion after Metro 
West because those facts were controverted in other parts of the 
briefs with citations to the record. See id. ^ 15. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court, because the "additional facts" 
- found in the briefing with citations to the record - still did 
not raise genuine issues of material fact. Id. % 22. In a footnote, 
the Utah Court of Appeals addresses its dissatisfaction with the 
Metro West rule: 
Although we are bound by the Utah Supreme Court's most 
recent interpretation of rule 4-501 (2) (B), we respectfully 
note that the rule announced by the court leaves it unclear 
what remedies are available to trial courts for a party's failure 
to follow the procedure outlined in rule 4-501 (2) (B),... 
If compliance with former-rule 4-501 (2) (B).. .is anything 
other than a mere suggestion, then it seems that a trial 
court must have the discretion to grant summary judgment 
in instances where it would not otherwise be sanctioned 
by rule 56(c) alone. In other words, if failure to comply 
with the rule is 'harmless' as long as a disputed fact can be 
gleaned from the opposition papers, then the rule would 
seem to add nothing to what rule 56 already requires. 
Id. % 15 n.2 (internal citation omitted). The Court of Appeals 
continued, stating "it currently is unclear whether granting summary 
judgment, because facts are admitted as undisputed that otherwise 
would not have been, is ever within the trial court's discretion for 
failure to comply with the rule" and asked "the Utah Supreme 
Court to clarify the scope of remedies under rule 7(c) (3) (B) 
to guide trial courts." Id. This pointed footnote suggests the 
Utah Court of Appeals' dissatisfaction with Metro West and its 
view that Metro West created uncertainty about the effect of 
noncompliance with the rule. The Utah Supreme Court did 
not immediately respond to this footnote, and the Utah Court 
of Appeals has continued to interpret Metro West to limit trial 
courts' discretion without actually reversing them. 
In 2005, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the effects of a 
failure to comply with rule 4-501 in a footnote in Anderson 
Development Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36,116 P.3d 323, noting: 
[Djistrict courts have "discretion in requiring compliance 
with rule 4-501." Gary Porter Constr. v. Fox Constr, 
Inc., 2004 UT App 354, f 10,101 R3d 371 (quoting 
Fennellv. Green, 2003 UT App 291, f 9, 77 R3d 339). 
While the district court could have granted [Appellant's]... 
motion for summary judgment on the basis of [Appellee's]... 
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by Defendants in accordance with rule 7 (c) (3) (B)." 2007 UT 
App 25, K 7. The court affirmed the trial court's decision but 
noted," [ejven had we determined that Defendants substantially 
complied with rule 7(c) (3) (B), we would still affirm the district 
court's order granting summary judgment on the alternate ground 
of unjust enrichment." Id. % 11 n.2. These cases illustrate the 
Utah Court of Appeals' belief that Metro West changed trial 
courts' broad discretion to deem facts admitted under rule 7, 
and that court's reluctance to apply its interpretation of Metro 
West to reverse trial courts. 
This review of the Court of Appeals' decisions on rules 4-501 
and 7 demonstrates that a party before that court may fail to 
comply with the procedural requirements of rule 7, and still 
avoid having facts admitted against them. The Utah Supreme 
Court, however, has affirmed a trial court's broad discretion to 
deem facts admitted for a failure to comply with rule 7. 
A trial court or litigant before that court may be asking what to 
make of these somewhat confusing decisions. Here are some 
facts that may help both: 
1. No Utah trial court has ever been reversed for granting summary 
judgment based upon facts deemed admitted for failure to 
comply with rule 7. 
2. The Utah Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the trial 
court's discretion to require strict compliance with rule 7. 
3. The Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted^/e/ro West to limit 
trial courts' discretion to strictly enforce rule 7. However, that 
court has also expressed hostility to the rule it extrapolated 
from Metro West and has never reversed a trial court for 
deeming facts admitted for violating rule 7. 
4. If a trial judge waives strict compliance with rule 7 and entertains 
the merits of a summary judgment motion, appellate courts 
are likely to also waive the violations of rule 7 and consider 
the merits of the motion. 
5. Trial courts may consider a harmless noncompliance test 
to support their decision to deem facts admitted, but even 
without this test, a trial court has discretion to rigorously 
apply rule 7. 
HOW UTAH ATTORNEYS CAN AVOID PTTFALLS AND SUCCEED 
IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE 
Utah attorneys have become adept at avoiding the clear intent of 
rule 7 and summary judgment. Summary judgment is a process 
intended to distill the facts; for summary judgment to be appropriate 
there must be no genuine dispute of material facts and the undisputed 
facts must entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. 
See UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c). Yet attorneys regularly file statements 
of uncontroverted facts that are longer than necessary, use 
undisputed facts to tell complex narratives rather than distill the 
issues to those relevant to judgment as a matter of law, and fill 
memoranda with disingenuous disputes of facts. 
To ease the burden on Utah's trial courts, decrease die expense 
of summary judgment motions for all parties, reform wasteful 
practices, and conform summary judgment motions to the clear 
purpose of the rule, attorneys should consider the following 
when moving for or opposing summary judgment: 
Statements of Undisputed Material Facts Should Set 
Forth Only Material and Critical Facts. 
Statements of fact in motions for summary judgment are often 
excessive and replete with facts that are either irrelevant or 
immaterial to the question of law on summary judgment. On 
summary judgment, a moving party's job is to simplify the case 
to its core undisputed issues. There must be no dispute of material 
fact, which does not mean a party should include every single, 
undisputed fact. Elaborate statements of facts or narratives told 
through such facts are wasteful and distract from the relevance 
of critical facts. Further, the more facts a party sets forth, the 
greater the opposing party's opportunity is to dispute those facts, 
limit statements of fact to the critical issues that are truly undisputed. 
Simple and concise statements of core material facts are all a 
party should include when moving for summary judgment. 
Problematic summary judgment motions are also present at the 
federal level, where neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 
nor Federal Rule 56 contain the requirements that Utah's Rule 
7 does. Instead, it is a matter of local discretion whether to 
require a separate statement of undisputed facts. The Federal 
Judicial Center is considering amending Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56 to require a statement of undisputed facts to 
accompany motions for summary judgment.1 
The proposed amendment would require a moving party to 
"state in separately numbered paragraphs only those material 
facts that the movant asserts are not genuinely in dispute and 
entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law" and an opposing 
party would have to separately address those facts.2 The proposed 
amendment makes clear that the intent of a separate statement 
is to identify those facts critical to the case. New York's federal 
courts have such a requirement and the courts interpreting 
it have stressed that the purpose of a separate statement of 
undisputed facts is to "streamline the consideration of summary 
judgment motions by freeing district courts from the need to 
hunt through voluminous records without guidance from the 
parties." Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 E3d 62,74 (2d Cir. 
2001) (emphasis added). 
If a fact is not necessary to the court's decision, it should not be 
included in a statement of core undisputed facts. Undisputed 
facts should closely follow the specific elements of a claim or 
defense. If a string of narrative facts is necessary to make a 
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